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GARRITY V. NEW JERSEY AND ITS PROGENY:
How LOWER COURTS ARE WEAKENING THE STRONG
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED POLICE OFFICERS
Donald Win. Driscoll'
I. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
It is only 3:30 a.m., not quite halfway through Officer
Murphy's (Murph) midnight to eight shift. Murph rides alone in
his police cruiser despite having less than five years experience
under his belt. The Police Commissioner has decided this area of
the city is not a "high risk" patrol area. Working alone in areas not
classified as "high risk" may be required pursuant to a recent
contract settlement after a longstanding intransigence by the police
union over "one-officer" patrol cars. Tonight's high volume of
requests for police assistance belies the contention that this area of
town is low risk. On this warm August night there have already
been three domestic incidents and one report of "shots fired" in
Murph's sector alone; in the latter incident, no weapon or shooter
was found.
As Murph maneuvers his patrol car into the parking lot of a
closed business, the cruiser's headlights illuminate the
unmistakable image of a lone male as he stands up from alongside
a motor vehicle parked in the lot. The suspicious male turns away
from the patrol car and walks away from Officer Murphy. Murph
exits his patrol car and requests that the man stop; the request is
ignored. His vehicle's spotlight reveals the suspect is concealing
something dark, metallic and at least partly cylindrical in front of
him. To assure his safety, Murph draws his service weapon and
loudly orders the suspect to stop and put his hands up. Instead, the
suspect looks over his shoulder and makes eye contact with the
officer. He begins to turn, facing the officer head-on. He is still
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holding what Murph now (reasonably?) believes is a gun. Could
this be the shooter from the previous call? More desperately this
time, Murph orders him to stop. His commands are completely
ignored. The man continues to turn on the officer. Alone, in the
dark, his voice commands ignored, and suspecting a gunman is in
the area, Murph fires his own weapon three times before the
suspect can spin completely around to face him. The suspect drops
instantly to the ground and dies within seconds.
The radio call of "shots fired" initiates a flurry of activity.
Officers respond from all over the city. Supervisors descend on
the area. Initial observations of the scene have them requesting
homicide and internal affairs detectives. The department's
information officer is awakened and summoned to the site. An
official from the District Attorney's office responds as well.
Everyone has a job to do; there are reports to be filled out,2
questions to be asked,3 information and evidence to be collected.
Despite what is likely to be the most physically and emotionally
draining moments of his life, Officer Murphy is responsible to
provide information about the incident since the only other witness
is dead.
The scenario, as laid out, is intentionally equivocal. With
the alteration of just one or two facts, this shooting turns from a
Based on the personal experience of the author as a police officer, the
individuals summoned to the scene and the paper work required to be
completed will, obviously, vary from department to department. But even
in a small department, a conservative estimate will mandate filing of an
initial police report, a supplemental report by each detective and supervisor
to respond, and a "use of force" report detailing the circumstances
surrounding the discharge of the officer's firearm.
Based on the personal experience of the author as a police officer, homicide
detectives are there to investigate the fatal shooting of a human being,
internal affairs is charged with determining whether or not all department
regulations regarding the use of force have been followed and whether any
violations of law have occurred and the supervisors must determine if their
subordinate officer was carrying out the duties assigned at the time of the
incident. Each of these must subsequently report up the chain of command.
The information officer is charged with disseminating information to the
media to meet the police department's need to remain accountable to the
public and the District Attorney's representative must decide whether that
office will investigate and/or file charges.
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"good shoot'A into a homicide; the officer can change from a good
street cop into a potential criminal.
The reader must consider two circumstances in this type of
situation. Under circumstance "A," the deceased suspect was the
"shooter" from the night's earlier call. He may have turned and
walked away from the officer in an attempt to conceal his handgun
or confuse the situation until he could take control and possibly
assault the officer. Under circumstance "B," the "suspect" is
simply little more than a stranded motorist. Having worked
overtime as a janitor at the nearby university, he may have been on
his way home. En route, his car suffered a mechanical breakdown.
Still wearing the walkman while buffing floors at the university, he
tried repairing the vehicle. The metal observed by the officer was
merely a screwdriver or tire iron. Failing to make the repairs
himself, he headed for a pay phone attached to the building as the
officer pulled into the lot.
In either case, the potential ramifications of this brief but
deadly encounter are long term and immense for the officer, the
police department, the municipality that employs him, the family
of the deceased, and the public at large. The immediate question,
for Murph at least, is what to say, when, to whom, and even how.
Depending on where he works and the attitude of his superiors to
such situations, he may or may not be afforded an opportunity to
collect himself or to consult an attorney before being questioned. 5
This is especially important considering that a civilian in Murph's
shoes is not required to answer any questions regarding such
matters. Rather, a civilian is told in plain, clear language that he or
she has a right to remain silent and to contact an attorney before
4 A "good shoot" is one that comports with departmental guidelines and the
law regarding use of force.
5 New York City police officers are not routinely interrogated in such
incidents until a time period of forty-eight hours has passed owing to a
departmental rule regarding such situations. See Eleanor Heard, Are New
York Police Officers Safely Playing or Playing It Safe? Eliminating the
Forty-Eight Hour Rule, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 133, 136 (2000)
(citing the New York Police Department, NYPD Patrol Guide § PG 118-09
(J. & B. Gould eds., Gould's NYPD Patrol Guide, Sept. 2001)).
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answering questions. 6  The ramifications of Murph's, or any
officer's, next step in this situation can be life-changing. What
makes the state of affairs so unusually pressing for Murph is that
his inquisitor is also his employer, adding an additional layer of
potential consequences to this situation.
Part II of this paper discusses the presence of potentially
conflicting interests in a situation analogous to that discussed in
Part I. The interests considered include those of the officer, his or
her department, and the political subdivision that maintains that
department. These considerations include an officer's strong
desire to protect his personal interests as opposed to the external
interests of the chief or department in protecting its image or
financial affairs. While only briefly enumerated in Part II, these
considerations indicate the depth of the problem faced by each of
the entities involved.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Garrity,
7
the protection the Court has afforded officers since this decision,
and the foundation upon which that decision rests. Because the
protection afforded officers under Garrity has been affected by
subsequent decisions in Kastigar8 and Gardner,9 the impact of
those decisions is also described.
Following examination of the protections established by the
Court, various cases are presented in Part V, which have
6 See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Subsequent to
Miranda, a civilian in similar circumstances is given a Miranda warning
similar to: "You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer any
questions. Anything you do say can and will be used against you in a court
of law. As we discuss this matter you have a right to stop answering my
questions at any time that you desire. You have a right to a lawyer before
speaking to me, to remain silent until you can talk to a lawyer, and to have
that lawyer present with you when you are being questioned. If you desire a
lawyer but you cannot afford one, one will be provided to you before
questioning without cost to you." New York State Police, Manual for
Police in the State of New York, Part II, 9 - 3 (New York State Police)
(1982).
7 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that the protection of
the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements
prohibits the use of those statements in subsequent criminal proceedings).
8 Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
9 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
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interpreted and applied Garrity and its progeny. The discussion
will consider whether police officers are indeed afforded the
constitutional protections against the use of coerced statements in
criminal proceedings, and whether the Court intended to protect
officers against termination for exercising their constitutional
rights.
The paper continues in Parts VI and VII with a
consideration of how these protections are weakened by police
department investigations, which categorize the investigation of
such officers as "routine" and thereby forces officers into choosing
between their constitutional right to due process in employment
situations or exercising their right to remain silent when
interrogated by the police.
The paper concludes by returning to the hypothetical with a
discussion of possible solutions to the dilemma many officers face
when the police, their employer, investigates them for possible
criminal behavior.
II. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS AND VARYING INTERESTS
A police officer involved in an "on-duty" shooting, similar
to Officer Murphy's, faces possible criminal and civil sanctions at
both the state and federal levels. District Attorney offices
routinely screen such shootings to determine whether formal
charges are applicable, ranging from assault to manslaughter and
even homicide. The possible terms of incarceration range from
one-year of imprisonment to a life sentence.
10
Police officers also face the possibility of charges by
federal prosecutors. Under Title 18 of the United States Code,
there are two applicable sections that an officer may be charged
under for an "on-duty" shooting. Under section 241, police
officers may be charged with conspiracy to deprive another person
'0 For example, New York describes assault 3 d as the infliction of physical
injury upon another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00(3) (McKinney 2003). This crime is classified as
a Class A misdemeanor (with a maximum term of incarceration of one
year). Murder is defined and characterized as an A-I felony (with a
potential life sentence). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2003).
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of his or her civil rights." I Section 242 prohibits persons acting
under color of law from violating another person's civil rights.
Under these provisions, an officer may face imprisonment ranging
from one year to life in prison or a death sentence.
13
Civil liability exists for police officers involved in shooting
incidents as well. It is impossible however, to determine potential
tort damages in officer-involved shootings. Damages are
dependent upon the particular circumstances of each situation and
the intricate functioning of the tort liability system. Nonetheless, it
has been estimated that damages awarded in officer-involved
shootings in the District of Columbia in the 1990's alone, have
reached almost eight million dollars. 14
What may be more immediately pressing (though less
overwhelming after having so recently taken a human life) are the
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised the same ... They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to
kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual
abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death." 18
U.S.C. § 241(1997).
12 "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,
Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in
violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death
results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts
include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an
attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be
fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both,
or may be sentenced to death." 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1997).
13 Id.
14 See Joseph J. Simeone, Duty, Power and Limits of Police Use of Deadly
Force in Missouri, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 123, 132 (2002).
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potential employment ramifications of a decision whether to
answer departmental questions regarding the shooting. As outlined
above, a myriad of government agents, both coworkers and
officials of the district attorney's office, will have many questions
for the officer(s) involved in a shooting. If an officer declines to
answer these questions to limit potential influence on possible
criminal and/or civil liability, he or she may face job-related
consequences. Failure to cooperate in a department's investigation
may be considered a dereliction of duty and failure to obey a direct
order to answer the questions put forth may easily be classified as
insubordination.' 5 If discipline evolves into suspension, or even
termination, economic hardship may become a reality. It is naive
to think that the officers investigating a shooting will protect their
own or will respect the "Thin Blue Line" or "Code of Silence,"
considering the immense pressure these officers face if an
investigation is hindered. 16 Not only are there potential conflicts
of interest among fellow officers, but there may also be conflicts of
interest between the police chief (a fellow officer) and the
15 See Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and
Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1309, 1382, n.15 (2001). In People v.
Gwillim, 274 Cal. Rptr. 415, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) for example,
Gwillim was questioned by members of the internal affairs division and
criminal division of the police department regarding allegations of
undesired sexual advances towards a fellow female officer. When Gwillim
refused to answer, he was advised that he could be subjected to
departmental charges which could result in his dismissal from employment.
Further, in Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1982), Hoover was
questioned by fellow police officers regarding possible criminal activity in
reported illicit sexual activity with a fifteen-year-old female and use of
narcotics. Hoover refused to answer questions related to the departmental
investigation until such time as the criminal matter was resolved. She was
subsequently terminated for violating the departmental rule requiring
employees "to give full, complete and truthful statements" in the course of
departmental investigations.
16 The "Code of Silence" has been well documented and generally refers to the
refusal of fellow officers to engage in behavior that will subject other
officers to discipline or other liability. See generally, Myriamn E. Gilles,
Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983
Municipal Liability, 80 B. U. L. REV. 17 (2000).
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department, as well as the municipality and the politicians that run
it.
Each individual officer involved in the shooting has
interests in his or her own self-protection, continuation of
employment, avoidance of incarceration, and averting liability for
any monetary damage awards. The police chief has interests
centered on prosecutions for wrongdoing, the maintenance of the
police department's image as a whole, as well as avoidance of
liability for civil damages. The municipality has these same
interests in the abstract, while also carrying the potential self-
serving interests of political officials. In the best case scenario, the
police chief's and politicians' interests will all coincide with, and
best be served by, standing by their officer and protecting his or
her interests. In the case of a questionable shooting however,
(consider Scenario "B" in the hypothetical in Part I) these interests
may quickly and wildly diverge. The best way to obtain re-
election or protect the image of the police department may be to
charge the officer with violations of department regulations, state,
or federal law and strongly pursue convictions for such violations.
III. GARRITY v. NEW JERSEY
Considering the numerous potential avenues for severe
financial consequences and possible incarceration, it is little
wonder police officers began to exercise their individual
constitutional rights; the same rights they frequently advise
suspected criminals to invoke. The first such instance to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court was Garrity v. New Jersey.17
In order to understand Garrity, one must consider the facts
as laid out in the lower court decision.' 8 In this case, a municipal
court clerk named Helen Naglee, along with Chief Edward Garrity
and police officer Edward Virtue, both of the Bellmawr New
Jersey Police Department, were indicted and convicted for
conspiracy to obstruct administration of the Motor Vehicle Traffic
Laws. An investigation ordered by the New Jersey Supreme Court
and conducted by the district attorney's office led to a grand jury
17 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
18 State v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209 (1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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indictment, which charged all three with conspiracy to unlawfully
dispose of eight drunken driving charges. Stated briefly, certain
individuals, while arrested for drunken driving, did not meet the
legal requirements to support that charge or suffered from certain
undisclosed "hardships." 9  The charges were downgraded to
improper passing, careless driving, and/or disorderly conduct.
Notations were entered into the court records that each had
appeared before the magistrate and had been fined; the magistrate's
name was signed by Naglee.
Before the charges were downgraded, Chief Garrity
conferred with the issuing officer and met with the accused. The
Chief subsequently requested that Naglee reduce the charge and
set, on his own initiative, a "fine." Interestingly, where the "fine"
was less than the posted bail, the money was not returned to the
accused. Testimony however, indicated the monies were not put to
any personal use.
20
While interviewing the officers involved, the deputy district
attorney advised them of their rights, saying:
[I] want to advise you anything you say must be
voluntary, of your own free will, without threats or
coercion or promise, or reward and anything you do
say may be used against you or any person in a
subsequent criminal proceeding, or proceedings, in
the courts of our state. You do have under our
statutes, as you may know a privilege to refuse to
disclose any information which may tend to
incriminate you. However, if you make such a
disclosure, with knowledge of this right and without
coercion, you thereby waive this right or privilege
with regard to any phase of this investigation. This
19 Id. at 216. Officer Virtue's statements indicated that Dr. Cooperman
examined at least some suspects on the borough's behalf. Charges on
tickets were downgraded in cases where the level of intoxication did not
violate the law.
20 Naglee, 44 N.J. at 209-17. Testimony indicated the money was diverted to
purchase police equipment or set aside for future use. The Chief testified
that this arrangement was acceptable to the parties involved, though some
of the accused denied having given such permission.
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right or privilege that you have is limited to the
extent that you as a police officer once sworn and
asked questions pertaining to your office and your
conduct therein, if you refuse to answer, you may
then be subject to a proceeding to have you
removed from the department.
2 1
The officers answered questions and were subsequently convicted
of conspiracy to obstruct justice. In reviewing the officers'
convictions and considering whether the officers' subsequent
statements were involuntary or coerced under the law, the appellate
court specifically considered the civil and polite tone under which
the questioning took place and referenced the absence of any
physical coercion, psychological persuasion, or attempts at
humiliation or ridicule. The appellate court ruled that the "threat"
of job loss was not an adequate degree of coercion to overwhelm
the will of the officers.
22
The Court focused on the warning or statement of the
officers' rights when it reversed Garrity in 1967.23 The Court
commented on the civil and polite manner in which the officers
were questioned stating, "subtle pressures may be as telling as
coarse and vulgar ones." 24 Further, the Court reasoned that the
manner or form of coercion, mental or physical, is not the
determinative factor. Rather, the important factor is whether the
accused has been deprived of his free choice to admit, deny or
refuse to answer.
In this instance, the Court found the choice between self-
incrimination and job forfeiture was unacceptable coercion.25 The
Court stated in plain language that "[t]he option to lose their means
of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent."
26
The holding in Garrity pertained specifically to whether or
not statements obtained under threat of removal from office could
21 Id. at217-18.
22 Id. at 219-21.
23 Garrity, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
24 Id. at 496.
25 id.
26 Id. at 497.
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be used in subsequent criminal proceedings against the accused.
The Court held that such statements were coerced, involuntarily
made, and under the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibited from being used in subsequent criminal proceedings.
27
Notably, in reaching its conclusion, the Court made reference to its
reasoning in Slochower v. Board of Education, stating, "a public
school teacher could not be discharged merely because he had
invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
when questioned.... 28 It is along this line of reasoning that the
Court issued its oft-quoted statement that "policemen, like teachers
and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights," foreshadowing future decisions discussed
below.2
9
A. Garrity's Foundation
Garrity has been interpreted as resting on two possible
doctrinal foundation: a due process prohibition against coerced
confessions and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which
prohibits government entities from offering a benefit conditioned
on the recipient forgoing a constitutional right.30  The former
interpretation seems strongest and is rooted in the plain language
of the Court's holding:
We now hold the protection of the individual under
the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced
statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal
proceedings of statements obtained under threat of
removal from office, and that it extends to all,
whether they are policemen or other members of
our body politic.
3 1
27 Id. at 500.
28 Id. (quoting Slochower v, Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 567 (1956)).
29 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
30 Clymer, supra note 15, at 1342.
3' Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
2003-2004
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
In finding the officers' statements were coerced in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court applied a voluntariness
test and determined the pressure exerted on the officers; the threat
of loss of employment "disable[d] [them] from making a free and
rational choice. The Court strengthened its characterization of
the statements as coerced and denounced the choice offered the
officers by adding: "[w]here the choice is between the rock and the
whirlpool, duress is inherent ... It always is for the interest of a
party under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. [This] does
not exclude duress."
33
Based on the Court's previous coerced confession
jurisprudence, one might consider this finding perplexing. The
Court's previous concerns regarding coercion in the context of a
confession stemmed from two major areas - fear of unreliable
confessions and a desire to condemn improper police tactics.34 If
these were the only two possible areas of concern, the Garrity
decision would truly seem an anomaly given the civil and polite
atmosphere in which the interrogations occurred and the identity of
the defendants in the case. Unconstitutional coercion however,
may be demonstrated by other than physical force. In fact, the
court made this clear when it stated that coercion "can be mental as
well as physical. 35 Simply because a police officer is the subject
from whom officials seek a confession does not mean he or she
cannot be coerced. It simply means that coercion may take a
different form, manifesting itself more subtly. In Garrity, the
Court stated, "policemen ... are not relegated to a watered-down
version of constitutional rights." 36 A police officer's rights may
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
32 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497.
31 Id. at 498.
14 Id. at 503 (Harlan, J., dissenting); See Clymer, supra note 15, at 1345.
15 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960)).
36 Id. at 500.
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not be trampled covertly any more than the average citizen's rights
can be trampled overtly.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine may be another
possible avenue for understanding Garrity. Essentially, this
doctrine states that it is impermissible for state or federal
government to offer a benefit based on the condition that the
recipient engage in, or abstain from, an activity that the
Constitution prohibits the government from demanding or
prohibiting directly.37  In Garrity, New Jersey violated this
doctrine by conditioning employment on the officers' foregoing
their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
38
A thorough reading of the case however, offers only
minimal evidence that the Court rested its decision on this
doctrinal foundation. At the conclusion of the majority opinion,
the Court equated the rights violated by the methods used in the
officers' interrogations to other "rights of constitutional stature
whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a
price." 39  One may interpret the Court's narrow wording as
undercutting the strength of its support for the claim under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Another possible
interpretation however, is that the proposition is stated so
succinctly because of its obvious truth. Broad wording is
unnecessary to simply state that New Jersey could not condition
the officers' employment on the relinquishment of their Fifth
Amendment rights.
It has been suggested that a straightforward application of
the Fifth Amendment, as opposed to analysis under the Fourteenth,
would better explain the outcome in Garrity.40  Under the Fifth
37 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), which held, "[I1f the government could deny a
benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized
and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a result which
[it] could not command directly.' Such interference with constitutional
rights is impermissible."); See Clymer, supra note 15, at 1348.
38 The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, "No person shall ... be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." U.S. CONST.
AMEND. V.
'9 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
40 Clymer, supra note 15, at 1354.
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Amendment, one may construe the district attorney's threat of job
termination as compelling the officers to incriminate themselves
and thus rendering their statements immunized. To understand
why the Court may have avoided such an application it is
necessary to understand the state of Fifth Amendment law and
immunized statements in 1967, when Garrity was decided.
In 1967, transactional immunity4 1 applied to compelled
statements under the Fifth Amendment.42 Such application would
mean that New Jersey, or any governmental administrative
investigation, could compel police officers to answer questions, but
the government could not prosecute them criminally in the future
for what was revealed. It was not until 1972 that the Court
accepted the more limited concepts of use and derivative use
immunity in Kastigar v. US. 43
B. Immunity - Transactional, Use & Derivative Use
Although the parties involved in Kastigar were not police
officers, but witnesses subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand
jury, the outcome has had a significant effect on the subsequent
application of Garrity. The government anticipated the witnesses
would assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and prior to their appearance, secured an order from
the district court directing the witnesses to answer questions
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002. Section 6002 provides immunity for
compelled witness testimony and states, in relevant part, that when
a witness is compelled by a district court order to testify over a
claim of privilege,
41 Transactional immunity is defined as immunity from prosecution for any
event or transaction described in the compelled testimony. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 754 (7th ed. 1999).
42 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); See Clymer, supra note 13,
at 1354.
43 Kastigar v. U.S., 406 U. S. 441(1972). Use immunity is defined as
immunity from the use of the compelled testimony (or any information
derived from that testimony) in a future prosecution against the witness.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (7thed. 1999).
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the witness may not refuse to comply with the order
on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination; but no testimony or other information
compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) may be used against the
witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise
failing to comply with the order.44
Essentially, the witnesses petitioned the Court to recognize
that the immunity supplied by the statute was in fact "use" and
"derivative use" immunity and that such immunity was not co-
extensive with the Fifth Amendment; that is, it did not offer the
same scope of protection as the Fifth Amendment. They sought a
ruling that only transactional immunity would equal the intended
protection against self-incrimination provided by the Constitution.
The Court held, "such immunity from use and derivative use is
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination" and is, in fact, sufficient to defeat a claim of
privilege and compel testimony from a witness. The Court went
on to state that transactional immunity is broader than the scope of
the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment in that it would
"mean that the one who invokes it cannot subsequently be
prosecuted., 45  The true goal is to leave the witness "in
substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his
privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity.,
46
Further, the Court also set forth strong protections for
individuals whose statements are offered after immunity is granted.
If such person shows that a statement was given under a grant of
immunity, the burden shifts to the government. This is a "heavy
burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was
derived from legitimate independent sources.' 47 In other words,
the government has the "affirmative duty to prove that the
4 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 448-49.
41 Id at 453.
46 Id. at 457.
47 Id. at 461-62.
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evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source
wholly independent of the compelled testimony.
'A8
If the Court was reluctant to apply a transactional immunity
analysis in Garrity so as not to completely preclude a state from
prosecuting police officers suspected of criminal wrongdoing, one
would expect to see application of "use" and "derivative use"
immunity in cases involving police officers. "Use" immunity
found acceptance with the Court in such situations in 1968.49
IV. Police Officer Protection After Garrity
After Garrity, protection of police officers in this context
was affirmed by the Court. Gardner v. Broderick involved a New
York City police officer charged with illegal gambling involving
payoffs to police officers. Gardner was told the grand jury
questions would center on performance of his official duties. He
was advised that the United States Constitution and the New York
State Constitution provided that he could not be compelled to
testify against himself. However, he was also told that a public
officer questioned by a grand jury is required to sign a waiver of
immunity to retain his or her employment. 50 Gardner refused to
waive his immunity and was subsequently terminated from
employment with the police department. The Court ruled that his
dismissal, based solely on his refusal to waive immunity to which
he was entitled under the Fifth Amendment, was not valid.51
In dicta, the Court stated that the privilege against self-
incrimination applies to state as well as federal proceedings, and
that a waiver of the privilege can only be done knowingly and
voluntarily. Absent such waiver, answers could only be compelled
"if there is immunity from [flederal and [s]tate use of the
compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal
prosecution against the person testifying."
52
48 Id. at 460.
49 Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
50 Id. at 274-75.
" Id. at 278.
52 Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
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This decision seems to mirror earlier indications that the
Court was unwilling to preclude the government from investigating
the performance of its agents (including police officers) and
initiating criminal proceedings against them. The Court however,
afforded the officers the same constitutional protections offered
any other person accused of a crime - the right not to be compelled
to testify against themselves. Further, the Court extended this
protection when it prohibited the use of the compelled testimony or
its fruits in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the witness.
Gardner explained the circumstances under which
testimony may be compelled from a police officer despite his or
her Fifth Amendment protections, what use that testimony could be
put to, and under what conditions a waiver may be made (when it
is "knowing" and "voluntary). 53
In analyzing whether the Court's intended protection of
public officers in general, and police officers in particular, is
receiving full effect, it is necessary to consider the circumstances
present when a waiver is not made knowingly or voluntarily. A
complete analysis of the circumstances under which one can be
considered to have "knowingly" or "voluntarily" waived a
constitutional right is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
one particular area merits discussion to asses whether the Court's
intention to protect officers is being met. This area involves
whether the requirement to sacrifice one's constitutional right to
assert another should be permissible and construed as a voluntary
waiver.
In a related case, the Court addressed a defendant's need to
testify at a suppression hearing to meet standing requirements for
advancement of a claim that his Fourth Amendment (unlawful
search and seizure) rights were violated. 5 To advance a
suppression motion, the defendant witness must take the stand to
explain his connection to the evidence in question. This item may
be an incriminating article of evidence, such as a weapon used in
3 Id. at 276.
54 Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
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the crime or the proceeds of a robbery. 55 To accomplish this, the
defendant must forgo his Fifth Amendment rights in order to
advance his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court held that "when a defendant testifies in support
of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds,
his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on
the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection." 56 In reaching that
conclusion the Court stated it was "intolerable that one
constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another." 57  The Court did not use the word "involuntary" to
describe the defendant witness's testimony. In commenting on the
"undeniable tension" between both constitutional rights however,
the Court impliedly indicated that such testimony could not be
considered voluntarily given.
58
Notably, in a subsequent and somewhat related case, the
Court stated that the validity of the reasoning in Simmons is
questionable. 59  To date however, Simmons has not been
overruled.6 °  In fact, in the subsequent case of Lejlowitz v.
Cunningham, the Court cited its holding in Simmons. 6  In that
case, Cunningham was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury
investigating his actions while he was in political office.
Cunningham refused to sign a form waiving his Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination. He was subsequently
terminated from his political appointment pursuant to section 22 of
New York's Election Law.
62
55 See Kate E. Bloch, Police Officer Accused of Crime; Prosecutorial and
Fifth Amendment Risks Posed by Police-Elicited "Use Immunized"
Statements, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 625, 656-57 (1992).
56 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
57 id.
58 Bloch, supra note 55, at 657.
59 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (ruling that a unitary trial in
which the defendant must choose between remaining silent about his guilt
or speaking out regarding punishment does not unduly burden the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights).
60 Bloch, supra note 55, at 659.
61 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
62 "If any party officer shall, after lawful notice of process, willfully refuse or
fail to appear before any court or judge, grand jury, legislative committee,
officer, board or body authorized to conduct any hearing or inquiry
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The Court upheld the lower court's determination that such
action was an unconstitutional infringement of Cunningham's Fifth
Amendment rights. The Court described section 22 as "coercive"
because "it require[d] [Cunningham] to forfeit one constitutionally
protected right" in order to exercise another. 63  Further
consideration of this issue is discussed in Part VII after an analysis
of where the law currently stands regarding police officers' right to
remain silent.
Evidently, the holdings in Garrity, Kastigar, and Gardner
suggest that the Court supports investigating police officer
wrongdoing, but not at the expense of their constitutional rights,
including their right to remain silent. Because police officers "are
not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights,"
64
the Court mandated that use and derivative use immunity may
apply to any compelled statements given by officers under
investigation. Further, officers may not be terminated from
employment for refusing to make statements absent such
immunity.
An analysis of subsequent cases however, shows neither of
these two important protections is receiving full compliance.
V. ARE COURTS FOLLOWING GARRJT?
A. Use of Immunized Statements Against Police Officers
Federal and state courts have continued to allow statements
made by accused officers to be "used" tangentially, to spur
investigations, prepare for prosecution, and plan trial strategy. For
example, in US. v. Anderson, Officer Anderson was accused of
deliberately kicking an arrestee while subduing him after the
concerning the conduct of his party office or the performance of his duties,
or having appeared, shall refuse to testify or answer any relevant question,
or shall refuse to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal
prosecution, his term or tenure of office shall terminate, such office shall be
vacant and he shall be disqualified from holding any party or public office
for a period of five years." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 22 (McKinney 1964) (It is
important to note that § 22 was later changed to § 2-128 and was repealed).
63 Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 803-08.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
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subject fled the scene of his arrest.6 5  In the course of the
preliminary investigation, the police department questioned Akers
(the arrestee) regarding the incident. While the truthfulness of his
statement was questionable (due to a later allegation that it was
prompted by Anderson's promise of a future benefit), at the time
Akers was questioned he said he believed that Anderson's "kick"
to his mid-section was accidental. The information obtained from
the department's investigation was forwarded to, and returned by,
the United States Attorney's Office with a note declining to
prosecute the matter criminally as it was deemed to lack
"prosecutive merit.",66  Officer Anderson was subsequently
interviewed by the department and advised that neither his
statement, nor any of its fruits, would be used against him in any
criminal proceedings.6 7  The department's internal affairs
investigator subsequently re-interviewed Akers to "corroborate"
Anderson's statement.68  After re-interviewing Akers, at which
point he offered a statement diametrically opposed to his original
version of events, criminal charges were brought against Anderson.
At a Kastigar hearing, 69 the trial court suppressed Anderson's
statements made to the department during its internal affairs
investigation and any evidence procured by the government
resulting from these statements. The court ruled "it was obvious
65 U.s. v. Anderson, 450 A.2d 446 (D.C. 1982).
66 Id. at449.
67 The warning offered Anderson stated, in pertinent part:
[Als no criminal charges will be preferred [sic] against you ...
I am going to require you to furnish me a statement, in
addition to questioning you about the allegations made against
you ... This questioning concerns administrative matters
relating to the official business of the Police Department. I am
not questioning you for the purpose of instituting criminal
charges and prosecution against you ... even if you do
disclose information which indicates that you may be guilty of
criminal conduct, neither your self-incriminating statements
nor the fruits of any self-incriminating statements you make
will be used against you in any criminal legal proceedings...."
Id. at 450 n.1.
68 Anderson, 450 A.2d at 455 (Newman, J., concurring).
69 A Kastigar hearing is a hearing to assure that evidence sought for
introduction by the government is not derived, directly or indirectly, from
the defendant's statements.
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that 'knowledge gained from the statement of [Anderson] was
used. ,970
Notwithstanding Garrity and Kastigar, the D.C. Court of
Appeals overruled the trial court and admitted the evidence against
the officer.71 The court reached its holding despite Anderson's
compelled statement and the heavy burden on the government to
affirmatively prove its evidence used to prosecute the police
officer.
It is unwarranted to consider Anderson as an anomaly. In
1991, the Ninth Circuit, in Gwillim v. San Jose, considered
whether the use of another police officer's compelled statement ran
afoul of Garrity and Kastigar.7  Here, a male police officer on a
stakeout with a female officer was later accused of sexual battery,
assault, and false imprisonment by the female officer. During the
course of the police department's investigation, the accused officer
was compelled to make a statement regarding the incident to avoid
any potential adverse employment action. Despite assurances
that his statement would not be used in the criminal proceedings,
the statement was shared with the female officer in order to
convince her to testify against him in the criminal matter (without
whom a prosecutable case was lacking).74 Despite the state trial
court's finding that such use violated the promises made to the
officer, the state appellate court reversed the trial court. The court
focused on whether the victim's testimony was based on her own
knowledge and completely discounted whether the officer's
immunized statement was used by the prosecutor in convincing the
witness to testify against him.
75
A civil rights action was instituted alleging that
transmission of the compelled testimony violated Gwillim's
constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of Gwillim's claims, but failed to specifically
address the issue of whether transmission of the officer's
70 Anderson, 450 A.2d at 450.
71 Id. at 453.
72 Gwillim v. San Jose, 929 F.2d 465 (9t" Cir. 1991).
73 See Clymer, supra note 15.
74 People v. Gwillim, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1254, 274 Cal. Rptr. 415, 416-20 (Cal.
App. 6 th Dist. 1990).
SId. at 425.
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immunized statement to the female officer was a violation of
Gwillim's constitutional rights. The court stated that the only issue
before it was whether transmission of the compelled testimony to
the district attorney was a violation of the officer's constitutional
protections; the court found that it was not a constitutional
violation. In dicta however, the court indicated that passage of the
substantive portion of the statement to the victim to convince her
to testify might pass constitutional muster, deeming such passage
was merely "close" to evidentiary use.
76
State courts have faced similar issues. In People v.
Corrigan, a New York case, a police officer testified voluntarily
before the grand jury.77 Officer Corrigan's testimony revolved
around the arrest of an individual made while off-duty, but
working as a security guard at a local restaurant. It was alleged
that during the arrest, while assisting the on-duty officers who took
the suspect into custody, the defendant police officer grabbed the
arrestee by the throat and struck him in the head with his flashlight.
After the incident, but prior to his grand jury testimony, an internal
investigation was conducted. The accused officer was compelled
to make a statement under threat of termination. 78 This statement
was made available to the prosecutor while preparing for the grand
jury testimony, and in fact, the statement was held in plain view by
the prosecutor while questioning the defendant officer before the
grand jury.79 Considering the heavy burden placed on the
government in such situations, both lower courts and the dissent in
the Court of Appeals decision, properly concluded that the obvious
and reasonable conclusion was that the compelled, immunized
statements were used in general case preparation, in formulating
questions of the officer before the grand jury, and as a visual prop
or "smoking gun" during the officer's grand jury testimony. This
was an obvious attempt to intimidate the officer into forcing his
grand jury testimony to conform to the statement made to the
internal affairs investigators. 80 After all, the prosecution did not
76 Id. at 468.
77 People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y. 2d 326, 590 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1992).
78 Id. at 327-28.
79 Id. at 332.8o Id. at 332 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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81
receive and hold the statement before the grand jury by accident.
Nonetheless, the court reversed and reinstated the indictment.
This decision is surprising because along with issuing a
decision ordering the reinstatement, the court stated that a
defendant's guarantee of immunity should be "scrupulously
protected" and made clear that it did not condone this type of
government behavior. In fact, the court went on to say that the
practice should be "avoided.
8 2
Another state court has also indicated that non-evidentiary
use of compelled immunized testimony does not present grounds
for a dismissal of a criminal case. The facts in Commonwealth v.
Marotta involved a Boston police officer investigated by his
department's internal affairs division after a motorist accused him
of demanding a payoff so he would not tow his car. 83 While the
criminal division within the department declined to pursue the
matter, Officer Marotta was ordered to give a statement under the
standard assurance that it would not be used against him
criminally. Despite a fruitless initial investigation, subsequent
complaints led to an expanded investigation and a criminal
indictment charging the officer with multiple counts of extortion,
bribery, larceny, and attempted larceny.84 Officer Marotta asserted
that the division's identification of him as a suspect resulted from
his prior statement to the department. Because the officer had
issued, signed and indicated his identification number on
summonses issued at the time these alleged incidents occurred, the
court concluded that the government had sustained its burden of
proving that the officer's identity was established beyond any
reasonable doubt. It was unnecessary to resort to his compelled
immunized statement in which he admitted citing the motorist
involved, but not demanding any payoff.85  While such a
conclusion seems eminently reasonable, this case is concerning
because in dicta, the court stated its agreement with the First
8' Id. at 332-34.
82 Id. at 332.
83 Commonwealth v. Marotta, No. 95-11210, 1996 WL 328233, at *1 (Mass.
Super. 1996).
8 Id. at *1-2.15 Id. at *3.
2003-2004
Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal
Circuit that "non-evidentiary or tangential use of immunized
testimony" is not grounds for dismissal.8 6
B. "Use" of Immunized Statements Affecting Other
Law Enforcement Officers
Police officers are not the only public officers affected by
non-evidentiary use of immunized compelled testimony. For
example, in US. v. Daniels a corrections officer (Lieutenant
Sayes) in a supervisory capacity was accused of observing, but
failing to terminate the beating of an inmate.8 7 In the course of the
internal investigation, Sayes was offered immunity in exchange for
making a statement to the prison's investigating officer. In this
statement Sayes admitted being a witness, identified the assailants,
and offered details of the attack. This statement was then put into
the Sayes' personnel file, which was included in the materials
offered to the F.B.I., who investigated the incident. The F.B.I.
subsequently filed federal charges against Sayes and other
corrections officers. The indictment against Sayes was
successfully dismissed because the F.B.I. had access to Sayes'
immunized statement. However, a new indictment was obtained
by a second F.B.I. agent who was not given access to Sayes' first
statement though he had access to the first agent's reports and
summaries written with knowledge of Sayes' immunized
statement. 88
The court upheld the indictment and determined that the
government's heavy Kastigar burden was met because Sayes'
statement was not offered to the grand jury due to the credibility of
the agents' verbal assurances that Sayes' statement was not used in
the course of the investigation. 8
9
86 Id. at *4.
87 U.S. v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2002).
8 Id. at 175.
89 Id. at 181.
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C. "Use" of Immunized Statements Outside Law
Enforcement Settings
Both state and federal courts allow tangential use of
immunized testimony in criminal proceedings where the statement
has an influence on trial preparation or an indictment. Such use
has been allowed in cases where the defendant is not employed as
a public officer within the criminal justice system. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit reinstated an indictment obtained against a
Georgia Department of Labor employee for bribery and extortion,
despite a lower court having twice dismissed the indictment on the
recommendation of the magistrate.90 The magistrate found the
indictment violated Fifth Amendment protections because an F.B.I.
agent was privy to the defendant's prior compelled, immunized
grand jury testimony and the assistant U.S. attorney who obtained
the first (dismissed) indictment participated in the process to obtain
the second.91  In reinstating the second indictment the court
downplayed the "heavy" Kastigar burden stating, "in legal terms,
the government is only required to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence an independent source for all
evidence introduced., 92  The court reviewed the government's
evidence in camera and found the government met its requirement
to show that the "evidence more likely than not was derived
independently of Byrd's testimony" and was accurate.93 The court
reasoned that while Kastigar mandates an immunized witness (and
the government) must be left in substantially the same position as
if the claim to his Fifth Amendment rights was not circumvented,
this standard "did not explicitly mandate that the position of the
parties remain absolutely identical in every conceivable and
theoretical respect."
94
The Second Circuit came to a similar conclusion in US. v.
Mariani.95 Here, the lower court vacated the conviction of Mariani
90 U.S. v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).
9' Id. at 1526-27.
92 Id. at 1529 (emphasis added).
93 id.
94 Id. at 1530.
95 U.S. v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595 (2"d Cir. 1988).
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for RICO violations 96 in a scheme involving illegal payoffs to
certain union representatives in exchange for the right to remain
delinquent in pension fund payments and to use non-union labor.
97
The trial court vacated Mariani's conviction because it found the
government utilized Mariani's immunized testimony to confirm his
association with an organized crime figure and in planning for
trial.
The Second Circuit reversed and held the Kastigar burden
was met because the prosecutor "established that he had prior
knowledge of substantially all the information covered in the[defendant's] testimony.9 The court stated that this prior
knowledge of substantially all the information in Mariani's
immunized testimony either foreclosed the possibility that the
prosecutor made any direct or indirect use of it, information
derived from it, or that any such use was "wholly conjectural and
insubstantial." 99
The First Circuit indicated its agreement in Serrano v. US.,
where a complicated scheme of hiding the true ownership of assets
exchanged between various financial institutions (as collateral for
what were essentially short-term loans) resulted in the conviction
of three defendants for mail and wire fraud.100 An F.B.I. agent
viewed (on television) Serrano's immunized testimony to the
Puerto Rican House of Representatives when it conducted
investigations into this scandal. When the agent subsequently
testified to a grand jury resulting in an indictment in a related case,
the agent referred to Serrano's testimony and revealed that Serrano
had admitted meeting with the other players in the scheme. The
indictment obtained from the agent's testimony was related to the
indictment from which Serrano appealed in this matter; however,
the First Circuit (and lower court) ruled the error was harmless in
light of the other substantial evidence in the offered testimony,
documentary evidence received by the grand jury and the
tangential nature of the reference. Despite finding the
96 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
97 Mariani, 851 F.2d at 596-98.
98 Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
99 Id. at601.
100 Serrano v. U.S., 870 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1989).
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government's action clearly "improper" the court declined to take
any remedial measures to protect such defendants in the future, and
thus dismissed the opportunity to recognize the strong protection
the Court has afforded witnesses who testify despite their Fifth
Amendment protections.101 As to Serrano's concurrent complaints
that the prosecutor utilized his immunized testimony in
formulating trial planning and strategy, the court ruled that the
issue was not properly preserved for their consideration, but
nonetheless indicated their agreement that immunized testimony
may permissibly be used to tangentially influence the prosecutor's
thought processes in preparing for trial. 1
02
Similarly, in US. v. Velasco, the court allowed the
prosecutor to use immunized testimony in developing trial
strategy. The defendant, Garcia-Caban, made a privileged
"proffer" to the government in which he recanted a large portion of
his post-arrest statement. The government promised it would not
use the statement, save for the possibility of impeachment.,0 3 At
trial however, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor
informed the judge that Garcia-Caban had recanted his story. At
trial, the government offered only the portion of Garcia-Caban's
statement that he did not recant, demonstrating knowledge of the
retraction. The defense argued that this did not comply with the
completeness doctrine, which allows for entrance of a writing or
utterance (and sometimes admissions, confessions etc.) only when
a portion has been offered by the opponent. 10 4 The court ruled for
the government, holding that the prosecutor had merely discarded
portions of the statement he deemed irrelevant. 0 5 It went on to
state that accepting, arguendo, that the prosecutor used Garcia-
Caban's statement to formulate trial strategy "the mere tangential
influence that privileged information may have on the prosecutor's
lOt Id. at 16.
102 Id. at 17-18.
103 U.S. v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1470 (7th Cir. 1992).
104 Id. at 1471-72. When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that
time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which
ought in farness to be considered contemporaneously with it. Fed. Rule
Evid. 106.
105 Velasco, 953 F.2d at 1472.
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thought process in preparing for trial is not an impermissible 'use'
of that information."106
When using immunized testimony, the Court has imposed a
duty upon the government to leave the immunized witness and the
government in substantially the same position had the right against
self-incrimination not been circumvented. Considering this
protection afforded immunized witnesses, it seems prudent to
conclude that the government should be forced to proceed as if the
witness had not made a statement. It seems contradictory to allow
the prosecution to use immunized statements in trial preparation
and strategy because it circumvents the intended purpose of the
Court. Some courts have seen the logic in such reasoning.
For example, in US. v. McDaniel, the Eight Circuit
employed such reasoning when the defendant appealed his
convictions from federal charges stemming from improprieties
(embezzlement and misappropriation of funds) at the bank where
he was president. 0 7 Due to a concurrent state investigation during
the course of the federal investigation, McDaniel was compelled to
testify before a state grand jury. The law under which he testified
conferred transactional immunity and realizing this, McDaniel
offered three volumes of transcripts that included incriminating
testimony. The U.S. attorney requested, received and read all three
volumes. 1°8  The state court judge quashed all the state
indictments, but the federal court judge did not; McDaniel was
tried in two separate trials for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 656 &
1005 and was convicted. McDaniel appealed and the Eighth
Circuit held, "the United States Attorney's reading of McDaniel's
state grand jury testimony 'constitute[d] a prima facie "use" of
it'..." and remanded for determination as to whether he testified
under immunity and whether that testimony was the subject matter
of the federal prosecution. 10 9
On remand, the trial court answered both questions in the
affirmative. Kastigar however, was decided in the interim. This
change in the law meant McDaniel should have been afforded use
'06 Id. at 1474 (quoting U.S. v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1991)).
107 U.S. v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 306-07 (8h Cir. 1973).
'o' Id. at 307.
o9 Id. at 308.
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and derivative use immunity in federal court for his immunized
state grand jury testimony. The court concluded however, that the
U.S. Attorney's reading of McDaniel's testimony involved the
same prima facie "use" of it, which essentially put the federal
government in the same shoes as the state's attorney, and thus
transactional immunity still applied. The issue remained whether
McDaniel testified under immunity on matters related to the
federal government's prosecution. The district court sustained
McDaniel's objection and the government appealed."10
The Eighth Circuit held that subsequent to Kastigar, the
question was no longer whether the testimony related to the
transaction giving rise to the federal prosecution, but "whether the
prosecution used the testimony in prosecuting those charges."'
The court concluded that the government failed to satisfy its
burden of not putting the defendant's testimony to any use; uses
which "could conceivably include assistance in focusing the
investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to plea-
bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and
otherwise generally planning trial strategy." ' 1 2 Because there was
no assurance the defendant was protected from the "immeasurable
subjective effect" the prosecutor's reading of the grand jury
testimony may have had in the preparation and trial of the
government's case, the convictions were vacated. 1
3
In U.S. v. Pantone,114 the Third Circuit seemed willing to
accept that immunized testimony may have a tangential, non-
evidentiary influence on a prosecutor's thought processes in
preparation for trial or indictment. In this matter, a state court
magistrate was convicted of conspiracy to participate in a bribery
scheme involving illegal kickbacks from a bail bondsman. The
conviction was later overturned on other grounds. After the first
trial, Pantone was compelled to testify before a grand jury. At the
second trial, Pantone's motion to dismiss the case or disqualify the
government's prosecutor was denied and Pantone was convicted.
10 Id. at 308-09.
... Id. at 310.
112 Id. at311.
13 Id. at 312.
14 U.S. v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1980).
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Pantone appealed the conviction on the basis that the government's
prosecutor in the second trial was the same prosecutor that
questioned Pantone before the grand jury. He therefore possessed
intimate first hand knowledge of Pantone's immunized testimony.
The prosecutor assured the court it would present the identical
prosecution at the second trial as the government presented at the
first. 115
The court determined that Pantone sought a per se rule
requiring the withdrawal of a prosecutor who had knowledge of
such immunized, compelled testimony. Despite the government's
heavy burden under Kastigar, the court refused to grant such a
ruling. 11 6 In this case, the prosecutor was privy to immunized
testimony, but promised not to use it and present the same case at
both trials. Post-trial analysis indicated clear compliance with that
pledge; thus assuring compliance with Kastigar that the
defendant's immunized testimony was not used to convict him. 1
7
Although at first glance the facts above may seem to
indicate that the Third Circuit is willing to accept such tangential,
non-evidentiary influence upon a prosecutor's thought processes,
this decision may only be applied to the specific facts of this case -
where there are two complete sets of transcripts upon which to
conclude the Kastigar burden was met.
U.S. v. Semkiw however, removed any lingering doubt
whether the Third Circuit is committed to protecting the Fifth
Amendment rights of witnesses compelled to testify despite their
constitutional protection against self-incrimination." 8  Here, the
defendant was convicted in district court for violations of 41
U.S.C. §§ 51 and 54 (anti-kickback statutes). Prior to trial, he was
granted use immunity and testified before the grand jury. He was
later indicted. The defendant claimed the prosecutor used his
testimony as a "discovery deposition" in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights, giving the prosecution an unfair advantage in
trial preparation and plea-bargaining. 19 Unlike Pantone, in which
115 Id. at 716-22.
116 Id. at 719.
117 Id. at 722-23.
118 U.S. v. Semkiw, 712 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1983).
"9 Id. at 892-93.
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analysis of the two trial records (one pre-compelled testimony and
one post-compelled testimony) assured that the compelled grand
jury testimony was not used, in this instance there was no record to
conclusively show the government did not use the testimony to its
advantage in preparing the case against Semkiw.
In concluding that any possible use of Semkiw's testimony
in "refusing to plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-
examination, and otherwise generally planning trial strategy"
would be a violation of Semkiw's Fifth Amendment rights, the
Third Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded for furtherproceedings.120 Thus, the Third Circuit solidified its position that
compelled testimony cannot be used by the prosecution - non-
evidentiary, tangential or otherwise.
VI. CONCENTRATION ON THE "ROUTINE" & "EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE" ASPECTS OF INVESTIGATIONS HAS LEAD TO
FURTHER EROSION OF OFFICERS' RIGHTS
Lower courts have seemingly weakened Garrity and its
progeny in other ways as well. Garrity stands for the proposition
that an officer's coerced statements cannot be used against him in a
criminal prosecution. In considering whether a statement is
coerced, the Court specified the manner or form of coercion -
mental or physical - is not the determinative factor, but whether
"the accused has been deprived of his 'free choice to admit, to
deny or to refuse to answer."' 121  Keeping this in mind,
Commonwealth v. Ziegler is difficult to rationalize, and is evidence
of a further erosion of police officers' protections.
In Commonwealth v. Ziegler, a police officer was chasing a
suspect in a stolen car. 12 2 After the suspect's car struck Ziegler as
he approached on foot, a physical struggle ensued that led to the
suspect's death from the officer's gunshot. Immediately afterward,
Ziegler denied shooting the suspect, stating only that there was a
physical altercation where he hit the suspect on the head with his
20 Id. at 895.
121 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241
(1941)).
122 Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983).
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handgun. Ziegler stated that even if he discharged the weapon, it
was accidental. After examination of his weapon revealed one
spent round, he was escorted to police headquarters by another
police officer, his gun was confiscated, and he was prohibited from
making any phone calls. He was also subjected to further
questioning about the incident without being advised of his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. While these procedures were
done in accordance with departmental regulations, Ziegler
cooperated and even drew diagrams regarding the incident.
123
When the government indicated its intention to introduce his
statements at trial, Ziegler sought to have them suppressed as the
product of custodial interrogation, and his motion was granted.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed despite Garrity,
which stated that subtle pressures can be as coercive and violative
of constitutional rights as vulgar ones.12 4 In allowing Ziegler's
statements, the court reasoned that even though Ziegler was
accompanied by officers to the station, held incommunicado and
questioned regarding a homicide in which he could be the only
potential suspect of illegality, this was part of a "routine"
investigation; an investigation conducted more on the level of
employer and employee, rather than one of police agency and
suspect in a homicide investigation.125
A similar outcome occurred in a Massachusetts case. In
Commonwealth v. Harvey, Officer Harvey was accused of taking
an intoxicated male (Dayton) to a "dark" area of town and stealing
sixty dollars from him rather than transporting him to a shelter as
instructed. 126  Dayton complained to other officers about the
incident and Harvey was questioned about what occurred. Harvey
reiterated an earlier statement that no larceny occurred and that he
took the man to that area of town and released him at Dayton's
own request. Later, Harvey gave another statement pursuant to the
request of an internal affairs officer. All statements made by
123 Id. at 56-57.
124 Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496.
125 Ziegler, 470 A.2d at 58-59.
126 Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607, 608 (Mass. 1986).
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Harvey were materially identical and were admitted at trial,
resulting in his conviction. 1
27
Prior to trial, Harvey moved to suppress these statements.
His motion was denied by the trial court, which held his statements
were not the product of custodial interrogation nor obtained by
coercion under threat of removal from office. The judge ruled that
the "subjective fear that he would be dismissed [from office] if he
refused to give the statements under consideration [did] not
demonstrate that these statements were coerced."' 128 In affirming
the trial court's admission of the statements, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts recognized that Harvey was required by
department rules to obey the lawful orders of superior officers and
that this "imposed upon him an obligation to answer questions
regarding his duties.... ,,129 The court also stated it was "clear that
the defendant may have faced disciplinary proceedings which
ultimately could have resulted in his dismissal..." if he refused to
answer. 13  However, the court found these facts did not "compel"
the officer to answer because there was no overt threat nor any
express statement that he would be discharged for failure to
cooperate. 131 The court ignored the knowledge every police officer
possesses - that failure to obey a superior officer is the hallmark of
insubordination, which carries with it discipline up to and
including termination by stating "the defendant ... cited no state
statute or law that would 'mandate his removal from office upon a
failure to provide the requested statements."
' 132
Officers' fears, despite the courts' statements in Ziegler and
Harvey, that they may face termination for a refusal to provide
statements requested by a superior are by no means merely an
indulgence of their personal anxieties. In the cases explained
above, the officer's concerns regarding adverse job action led them
to provide the requested information pursuant to routine
procedures. It has been recognized however, that by mere subtle
127 Id. at 609.
128 Id. at 609-10 (quoting Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500).
129 Id. at 610 (citing Silverio v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 247
N.E.2d 379, 382 (Mass. 1969)).
130 Id. at 610.
131 Id. at 610-11.
132 Id. at611.
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manipulation of a few words, an officer who refuses to supply such
reports can be terminated. 133  Though the Court has not yet
confronted the situation where an officer has been terminated for a
failure to prepare routine reports, the line separating routine report
preparation and impermissible interrogation is difficult to assess.
An officer who refuses to prepare such reports upon request could
find himself or herself terminated not for exercising a
constitutional right, but for failure to discharge the duties of the
job.134
VII. OFFICERS ARE FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN Two
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS
A "routine" investigation by a police department may
require an officer to answer questions or face termination. Since
the police department is a government agency, this practice can
potentially create a conflict between an officer's Fifth Amendment
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination and
property rights in employment, and his or her Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights that prohibit use of coerced
statements in criminal prosecutions. 135 Support for the position
that such conflict is impermissible is garnered from the previously
quoted language in Garrity where the Court equated the rights
violated to other "rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a
State may not condition by the exaction of a price."'136  The
position is further bolstered by the language in Simmons that it is
"intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another."' 137 To date, no Court
decision has specifically addressed this issue, though numerous
lower court decisions have reached a conclusion that contravenes
the language in Garrity and Simmons.
133 See Robert M. Myers, Code of Silence: Police Shootings and the Right to
Remain Silent, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 497, 529-30 (1996).
134 Id.
13' Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
136 Id.
137 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
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Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia serves as an example of the
current jurisprudence on such issues. 138 In this case, investigators
advised Philadelphia police officers that they were under internal
affairs and criminal investigations for receiving bribes. After
administration of Miranda warnings, each officer was asked to
make a statement under threat of suspension with an "intent to
dismiss" if they refused. When they refused, each officer
subsequently received a notice stating the department intended to
dismiss them in ten days. The notice provided the charges upon
which the termination was based and gave each an opportunity to
offer reasons why termination was unjustified; each officer was
later terminated. 139
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether the
officers' due process rights against compelled self-incrimination
were violated. The court recognized that the officers had a
property interest in their jobs and considered the requirement that a
public employee who has a property interest in his job and faces
termination must be afforded "a pre-termination opportunity to
respond.... ,140 In determining that the officers received due
process and suffered no violation of, or unconstitutional burden
upon, their Fifth Amendment rights, the court rejected any notion
that the officers were not given a meaningful opportunity to
respond to the charges against them because they were compelled
to choose between asserting their right to silence and responding,
and thereby risking the use of any such response against them in
the criminal proceedings. The court based this rejection upon the
Court's decisions in Williams v. Florida
14 1 and US. v. Rylander.142
The court stated that if there is "no constitutional violation" when a
defendant in a civil contempt proceeding "is confronted with the
option of offering evidence to discharge his burden of proof or of
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege," a situation in which one
must choose between self-incrimination or possible incarceration,
then "a fortiori, there is no defect when one must opt between
138 Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241 (3d Cir 1986).
139 Id. at 242.
140 Id. at 243 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985)).
141 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
142 U.S. v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
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speaking at an employment termination hearing and asserting the
Fifth Amendment privilege."'
43
In relying on the principles espoused in Rylander and
Williams, the Third Circuit has set forth reasoning perfectly
appropriate in one circumstance and then misapplied it in another.
To understand this misapplication it is necessary to consider the
context of the Rylander and Williams cases.
In Williams, the defendant filed a pre-trial motion seeking
to be excused from Florida's Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.200;
the "Alibi Rule.' 144  This rule requires that a defendant who
intends to offer an alibi defense at trial must comply with the
prosecutor's written demand for notice of where the defendant will
claim to have been and supply names and addresses of witnesses
the defendant will offer to support his defense. 145 Williams stated
he would offer an alibi defense but claimed disclosure of further
information would essentially compel him to incriminate himself
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. His motion
was denied and he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
The Florida appeals court affirmed the conviction and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
In affirming the Florida courts' decisions, the Court
properly reasoned that defendants in a criminal trial, in an effort to
reduce the risk of criminal conviction, are often forced to testify
themselves or call other witnesses. Presentation of witnesses
necessarily reveals their identities and subjects them to cross
examination, all of which may prove incriminating or risks leading
the prosecution to incriminating rebuttal evidence. The Court
stated, "[tihat the defendant faces such a dilemma demanding a
choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has
never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination." 146 It stated that requiring pre-trial notice of
witnesses presented similar risks, but nothing in the Florida alibi
rule removed the defendant's free choice to present such a defense
or not. The rule simply moved the timing of notice to the pre-trial
14' Gniotek, 808 F.2d at 245-46.
'44 Williams, 399 U.S. at 78-83.
141 Id at 80.
'46 Id. at 83-84.
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stage of the criminal proceeding rather than having such issues
arise during trial, which would force granting continuances to deal
with issues raised by assertion of an alibi defense and witnesses.
147
In Rylander, a federal district court issued an enforcement
order at the request of the I.R.S. when Rylander, as president of
two companies, failed to comply with a subpoena to present
records and testify with respect to the documents. 148  Rylander
offered no response to the district court's enforcement order nor
did he appear at the hearing. Instead, he submitted an unsworn
letter to the court stating he did not possess the records. He
eventually appeared before the I.R.S. agent, but offered no records.
The district court held a contempt hearing at which Rylander's
only testimony was that he did not possess the records and refused
to submit to additional questioning, asserting his Fifth Amendment
rights. He was found guilty of contempt and appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that a defendant cited for
contempt for failure to comply with a subpoena need not meet the
evidentiary requirement of showing "categorically and in detail"
why he is unable to comply if "he properly claims that his
testimony as to the whereabouts of the documents might be
incriminating."1
49
The Court granted certiorari and held that Rylander could
raise a defense of a current inability to produce the records at the
contempt hearing, but could not re-litigate the enforcement order at
the contempt hearing. In essence, Rylander should have asserted
an inability to produce the records at the time of the enforcement
hearing. 150 The Court held that reliance on Fifth Amendment
protections did not remove a defendant's burden of producing
evidence to support a claim of inability to produce; reaffirming its
holding in Williams. Despite the tendency to put a defendant in a
dilemma of choosing silence or presenting a defense, the fact that a
defendant is forced to testify or call witnesses to decrease the
chances of conviction is not "an invasion of the privilege against
147 Id at 83-86.
148 U.S. v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983).
149 Id. at 755 (citing U.S. v. Rylander, 656 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (9 th Cir. 1981)).
ISO Id. at 757.
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compelled self-incrimination," even though such actions may
furnish the prosecution with evidence that may incriminate him.'
5 1
The Third Circuit and other courts relying on similar
reasoning have ignored or misunderstood a fundamental difference
between the reasoning in Rylander and Williams and situations
where officers are forced to choose between their due process
property rights in continued employment and the right to remain
silent when faced with criminal charges. The difference is that in
the former situation, where the Court has held that a dilemma
between constitutional rights (silence and offering a defense) is
acceptable, the dilemma arose within a single governmental
proceeding against an individual. In the latter situation, the officer
faces two different governmental proceedings, each presenting the
officer with the possibility of losing rights secured by the
Constitution; one a property interest in employment and the other a
liberty interest against self-incrimination. If the employment
investigation were carried on by a private employer, the situation
would be different because constitutional considerations prior to
depriving an employee of his or her job do not apply. Since the
employer in these situations is the government, a public employer,
the officer faces attack on two fronts simultaneously; both initiated
by the government and each possessing the potential to deprive the
individual of constitutionally guaranteed rights.
When an officer faces an internal investigation and a
concurrent criminal investigation, the government is, in the first
proceeding, forcing the officer to forgo one constitutional right, the
privilege against self-incrimination, in order to secure a second
constitutional right, a property interest in continued employment.
Further, the second proceeding, the criminal investigation,
continues to loom in the offing. Resolution of the dilemma
between silence and remaining employed, in the first proceeding,
invariably alters the very existence of constitutional rights
available at the second proceeding. If the officer elects to defend
himself in the first government case, the right to silence no longer
exists in the second because evidence of his or her prior defense,
successful or not, will certainly be introduced at the criminal
proceeding. The only sure means for an officer to preserve his or
151 Id. at 759.
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her constitutional right to silence in the criminal proceeding comes
at the cost of risking his or her constitutionally guaranteed right of
a property interest in employment during the first proceeding.
The Third Circuit, (and lower courts employing similar
reasoning) has failed to recognize that in Rylander and Williams
the defendants were choosing a course of action in only one
governmentally-instigated proceeding, whereas police officers
facing disciplinary proceedings are facing two such governmental
actions and the choice between two constitutionally-assured rights.
The failure of these courts to respect the Court's statement in
Simmons that it is "intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another" is as obvious as
the solution to the problem - stop doing so. 152  To solve this
problem, the Court should hear cases similar to Gniotek to
demonstrate definitively that subjecting officers to such a
constitutional dilemma in two separate, but linked, proceedings is
impermissible. While this may be the most direct solution, others
are presented below to address what "uses" may be made of
immunized testimony.
VIII. WHERE DOES THE SOLUTION LIE?
Returning to the hypothetical in Part I, it is obvious that
Officer Murphy is faced with an important dilemma. Everything
explained above has an influence on his decision, not only upon
what he can be forced to say, but also on when and how he should
say it. Under circumstance "A", where the suspect was armed, the
criminal proceedings will most likely be minimal and resolved in
his favor, although at least a presentation to the grand jury is still
likely. In both circumstances, however, Murph and the police
department face the possibility of civil proceedings that can take
years to resolve. But, this doesn't answer the deceivingly simple
question - "What should Murph do, speak or remain silent?"
152 Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
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At first glance, it seems the reasoning in Garrity, Gardner
and Kastigar would prohibit an officer's compelled statement
made during a department's investigation from being used against
him or her in a subsequent criminal proceeding. However, under
Anderson, Corrigan, and Marotta Murph's statements may be used
in a criminal proceeding by the prosecutor to prepare for trial,
prepare witnesses, or formulate a trial strategy. If Murph is aware
of this, he may decide that it is in his best interest to simply remain
silent and make no statement to his superiors investigating the
shooting to preserve his constitutional rights for trial. However,
this is not a viable option under Knight and Ziegler. The
department need only characterize the investigation as "routine"
departmental procedure to force Murph into supplying information
that may be used against him in a criminal proceeding or face
discharge. Characterizing the investigation as "routine" creates a
situation where an officer, presumed to be innocent, who chooses
to exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent,
experiences the loss of another constitutionally protected right - his
or her property interest in employment.
As the discussion above illustrates, a police officer in
Murph's situation, despite being in what is arguably the most
stressful circumstance of his life, must choose which constitutional
rights to protect; his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent or his
property interest in employment. He may try to solve his dilemma
by carefully wording any statement in order to keep his options
open, a procedure recommended by many police officer unions
that have recognized the lack of protection presently afforded
police officers.
'3 Based on personal experience of the author as a police officer and union
member, a currently popular suggestion, one implemented by many police
officer unions, is to advise officers to add the following preamble to any
statement offered: "It is my understanding that this report is made for
administrative, internal police department purposes only and will not be
used against me in a criminal investigation. This report is made by me after
being ordered to do so by a lawful supervisory officer. It is my
understanding that by refusing to obey an order to write this report that I
can be disciplined for insubordination and that the punishment for
insubordination can be up to and including termination of employment.
This report is made only pursuant to such orders and to obey that order. I
retain the right to amend this report upon reflection to correct any
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The true solution to this paradox however, lies not in police
officers like Murph drafting qualifications for their statements, but
in either the Court ruling on the matter or the various police
departments altering their methods of investigation. The Court
may choose to address the divide among the circuits and thus
eliminate uncertainty regarding whether immunized testimony may
be put to the tangential, non-evidentiary use of spurring
investigations, preparing for trials, and formulating trial strategies.
More options however, may be available to the departments
that investigate officers. One is to implement a two-team
investigatory approach for situations where an officer is suspected
of possible serious wrongdoing. One team can be assigned to
review all of the evidence in a criminal investigation of a suspect
officer and a second team used for trial presentation. In this
scenario, the only evidence or witnesses the second team has
contact with is evidence the first team clears for their use. In this
fashion, the first team can prohibit the second team from accessing
any witnesses or documents that have been tainted by the touch of
an officer's compelled statement; only evidence the first team
concludes will pass the heavy burden of Kastigar is approved for
consideration by the second team.
154
A related possibility is to maintain an office of independent
investigators as a subdivision of the district attorney's investigative
bureau. The investigators from this office should be hired from
outside the realm of law enforcement to minimize any tendency to
compromise investigations of criminal activity spurred by
identification with, or sympathy for, law enforcement personnel.
Such departments would maintain completely separate files and
conduct completely separate investigations from those conducted
internally by departments within the police force.'
55
Such a plan may present a problem should a grand jury
subpoena the internal affairs statement. This problem can be
solved however, through the creation of a "Projected Privilege."
unintentional mistakes without subjecting myself to a charge of
untruthfulness."
154 Clymer, supra note 15, at 1340-41.
'55 See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future Of State And Federal Civil Rights
Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
509, 601 (1994).
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Under this system, the internal affairs division of the police
department becomes the caretaker of any immunized statement an
officer makes to investigators. When a subpoena is received for
the immunized statement, the internal affairs investigators can
assert the officer's Fifth Amendment right and challenge the legal
appropriateness of turning over the statement.156
One final option is simple, though often overlooked. A
police department could take the accused's presumption of
innocence seriously and delay its internal investigation of an
officer until any criminal proceedings are resolved. While
departments may contend they have pressing interests in their
public image and in rooting out bad officers, these concerns can be
responded to without punishing an officer for unproven criminal
suspicions. The officer's duties can easily be altered by having
him or her assigned to in-house duties, such as desk work or paper
work, to keep him out of the public eye. In addition, suggestions
that the department might be covering for an officer engaged in
criminal activity can easily be answered by reminding concerned
citizens that everyone is entitled to the presumption of innocence
and appropriate action will be taken once any criminal allegations
are proven. By delaying the internal investigation until the
criminal action is concluded, the department would preserve its
entire array of investigatory tools, have the option of utilizing
evidence obtained in the criminal investigation, and not risk the
exclusion of any tainted evidence from one investigation to
another, thus compromising the criminal investigation in situations
of true criminal conduct by a police officer.
This approach may result in a longer period of time
between the suspect behavior and the department's opportunity to
obtain statements from witnesses. However, this problem is not
insurmountable. Constitutionally, a defendant is entitled to a
speedy trial in a criminal case. Further, the department could make
use of statements obtained during the criminal investigation. As a
final option, the department could question anyone involved except
156 See Andrew M. Herzig, To Serve And Yet To Be Protected, 35 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 401,437-38 (1993).
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the officer, thus assuring no taint by any statement the officer
might be compelled to offer.
IX. CONCLUSION
A thorough reading of the Court's decision in Garrity
indicates its clear intention to offer strong protections to police
officers compelled by their employers to give incriminating
statements against their own penal interest. That decision, in
combination with Kastigar and Gardner, shows that the Court
wants police officers and other public officials to be afforded the
same constitutional protections afforded all citizens accused of
criminal behavior. It is equally apparent that many lower courts
are weakening the protections the Court has promulgated. By
interpreting the "heavy" burden announced in Kastigar to mean
simply a preponderance of the evidence, and in allowing non-
evidentiary uses of privileged statements, an officer's compelled
statement may be used in focusing investigations, deciding to
initiate prosecutions, eliminating plea-bargain options, interpreting
evidence and planning trial strategy. When one considers that
entire law school courses are taught on developing trial strategy, it
is clear that such uses of otherwise privileged statements can be of
substantial and unfair assistance to the prosecution. Allowing such
use of compelled statements hardly leaves an officer or other
public employee in "substantially" the same position as if he or she
had been allowed to assert their Fifth Amendment rights.
This area of the law is ripe for Court intervention to
delineate what "uses" are allowed of statements compelled from
police officers despite Fifth Amendment protection. Until the
Court chooses to do so, police departments across the country must
reconsider their stance on investigations of police officers'
activities. Departments should afford accused officers the same
rights citizen arrestees are advised of daily. Police departments
must take the accused's presumption of innocence seriously, even
when it is another officer. Further, consideration should be given
to implementing the simplest of plans, that is, to reassign officers
under investigation and allow their intra-departmental
investigations to take a back seat to any concurrent criminal
investigations rather than disregard the protections the Court has
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already established or force an officer into choosing between
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
